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ooking back to central bank history, one may notice that 
conventionally these institutions were not supposed to be 
accountable to general public, but mainly to political powers 
of their countries.1 
Yet, in the last three decades, the most important institutional 
change for central banks was the attribution of political autonomy 
over monetary policy as well as the establishment of mechanisms 
for “operational transparency”. The main goal of monetary stability 
was another feature of this political movement. Having an 
exclusive aim, or a wellGdefined hierarchy of goals, was supposed 
to make the performance assessment straightforward. Therefore, 
accountability and transparency mechanisms2 were designed by law 
to assure that currency management could be evaluated by 
parliaments and heads of government.  
Nonetheless, since the 1990s, central bank regulations or 
statements related to operational transparency were also set up, 
though focused on market communication and economic 
efficiency of monetary actions. For instance, central bank, by their 
own initiatives, defined specific inflation targets for interest rate 
policy (the case for the ECB and after 2012 the United States’ 
Federal Reserve) or decided to publish minutes (the ECB after 
2015).3 This precise type of accountability mechanism has emerged 
as soft law, i.e. outside of the battles of the political arena.  
In my opinion, it has gone unnoticed in the economic literature, 
which refers to them only as mechanisms of “operational 
transparency” (Duran, 2012). Nonetheless, these central bank 
                                                
1 For an account on the history of accountability mechanisms of the European Central 
Bank, the United States’ Federal Reserve and the Brazilian Central Bank, see Duran (2012). 
For the foundational book on this subject, see Amtenbrink (1999).  
2 In Duran (2012; 2015), I distinguished accountability from mechanisms of transparency: 
“[f]rom the point of a political and legal view, transparency is a precondition (i) to 
legitimate monetary policy implemented by [...] independent CBs [central banks] and (ii) 
for the accountability of these institutions – it enables social forums and political 
institutions to monitor and evaluate their operation” (Duran, 2015: 121). 
3 In February 2015, the ECB decided to publish its minutes. The Financial Times attributed 
this decision to “public pressure for more accountability after the global financial crisis 
[which] has forced traditionally secretive rate setters to open up” (European Central Bank 
opens up with release of minutes' G 19 February 2015). 
L 
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regulations established an institutional framework for potential 
greater social accountability (Duran, 2015). These “soft” 
instruments complemented the legal structure for monetary policy 
transparency construed by hard law and parliamentary initiatives.  
The 2008 financial crisis, however, challenged this institutional 
framework for transparency in currency management.  
Firstly, the quantitative easing policies (QEs) became the “new 
normal” for central banks, since interest rate decisions exhausted 
its effects. Moreover, the intellectual consensus on the neutrality of 
money was contested and central banks gained more power and 
complex responsibilities related to financial stability (Goodhart, 
2010; Aglietta, 2011; Borio, 2011). For instance, the ECB is in 
charge of banking supervision in the framework of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This mandate creates new legal 
realities and challenges in relation to the independence of the 
institution. It also raises questions on how to keep ECB (new and 
old) powers in check.4 
It was already complex for citizens and political actors to assess 
central bank decisions through legal instruments related to 
operational transparency in traditional monetary policy (soft or 
hard law in nature). What could be said about the quantitative 
easing policies and new regulatory functions acquired after the 
2008 crisis ? In democratic and global integrated societies, how to 
assure supervision and evaluation of complex public actions taken 
by monetary authorities ?  
I argued (Duran, 2012; Duran, 2015) that the role of law in policy-
making, notably in monetary policy, is changing: from (i) ex ante 
framework to control the implementation of public policies 
(precise definition of instruments and legal quantitative limits to 
central bank actions)5 towards (ii) an ex post form of supervision, 
i.e. through the establishment of accountability and transparency 
procedures (by means of targets and goals combined with 
instruments for ex post evaluation and possibly application of 
judicial or other types of sanctions).6  
This movement was already noticed in modern monetary policy, 
but this trend tends to be reinforced in the 2008 aftermath in a 
more complex financial environment and with new mandates for 
central banks. These challenges call for the re-imagination of 
transparency mechanisms in monetary policy and banking 
supervision.7 This is also a way to re-legitimate central bank actions 
                                                
4 It is important to note that new obligations related to confidentiality and professional 
secrecy are also required. For instance, the ECB has to combine the growing demand for 
transparency with specific procedures of professional secrecy established particularly by 
two Directives of the European Union – e.g. Directive 2014/59/EU (articles 84(5) and 
98) and Directive 2013/36/EU (articles 59(2)). The ECB has been working with sensible 
information related to public debt and budgetary deficits of countries in the eurozone. It 
must also deal with confidential information in relation to the exercise of new powers in 
financial regulation. 
5 Historically, a legislative rule, which defined a ceiling for reserve requirements, or precise 
limits for issuance of paper money by central banks.  
6 Historically, a legislative rule, which defined a ceiling for reserve requirements, or precise 
limits for issuance of paper money by central banks.  
7 A recent article on the perspective of the ECB democratic accountability in the 
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in a post-crisis world. Thus how to improve the role of law in 
central bank transparency, notably at the ECB ? How to deal with 
the trade-offs between transparency and confidentiality in financial 
and monetary matters ?  
This research proposes to assess how a non-judicial body in 
Europe, the Ombudsman, is contributing to enhance the legal 
framework for the ECB transparency and broadening citizens’ 
oversight of central bank actions. This is particular important in 
the actual context of a growing complexity of ECB’s mandates and 
responsibilities.  
The Ombudsman has a very interesting hybrid nature: it is formally 
a parliamentary body, but operates as a quasi-judicial forum through 
individual complaints. It also has the power to initiate its own 
inquiries. It is designed to assure the respect of the rule of law by 
European institutions by investigating denunciations of “acts of 
maladministration”. The Ombudsman “illustrates a classic logic of 
parliamentary accountability” (Magnette, 2003: 678).  
This research aims, at first, to map the Ombudsman’s cases 
involving the ECB since its creation, and then to analyze how they 
are contributing to broaden the general public’s oversight of 
monetary regulation beyond markets and politicians. This paper 
presents the initial assessment of these cases and tries to contribute 
to the legal literature on how law can assure social accountability 
of central banks. In the next section, I present the literature gap on 
central bank transparency and accountability. I also propose one 
legal perspective, which might bridge this gap. In the third section, 
I present my first assessment of the Ombudsman’s cases involving 
the ECB and its monetary regulation. Even though Ombudsman’s 
pronouncements are non-binding (a very different feature if one 
compares to Courts), this European institution has been 
promoting identifiable impacts on ECB transparency. Its soft-law 
nature is contrasted with hard effects generated by few cases 
involving the central bank since 1999, as I will explore below. A 
brief conclusion follows. 
§ 1 – THE RESEARCH GAP ON ECB TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY: MORE LEGAL LITERATURE REQUIRED  
Since the 1990s, the literature on transparency and accountability 
of central banks is very proficient (de Haan et al., 1998; 
Amtenbrink, 1999; Bini-Smaghi and Gros, 2001; Van den Berg, 
2005; Blinder, 2004; Lybek, 2005; De Haan and Osterloo, 2006; 
Dincer and Eichengreen, 2007; Goodfriend, 2007; BIS, 2009; 
Laurens et al., 2009; Van der Cruijsen et al., 2010a; 2010b).8 Yet, I 
argued elsewhere (Duran, 2012; Duran, 2015) this literature (1) had 
essentially an economic perspective (i.e. focus on efficiency of 
monetary policy and central bank communication towards market 
                                                
framework of the SSM is Grandrud and Hallerberg (2015). 
8 The literature not focused on central banks, but especially relevant for the concept of 
accountability in European and international contexts is: Bovens (2007a; 2007b; 2010), 
Grant and Keohane (2005), Scott (2006) and Dowdle (2006).  
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agents), (2) accountability instruments were fused with transparency 
tools and the main literature did not sufficiently pay attention to the 
differentiation between ex ante and ex post institutional mechanisms to 
keep monetary power in check; and (3) the growing relevance of soft 
law was not identified by this intellectual field, as the main 
institutional innovation of central banks in the last decades.  
Another literature gap is related to the analysis of checks and 
balances, notably for the ECB, from the perspective of judicial and 
non-judicial bodies, i.e. the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the European Ombudsman. Few studies have been 
focused on judicial review. For instance, I may mention the 
collection of articles on the CJEU’s decision related to the 
implementation of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by 
the central bank (the “Gauweiler case”) published as special section 
at the German Law Journal (2015). However, these articles focus 
rather on the implications for the constitutional design of monetary 
policy instead of how the CJEU is contributing (or not) to enhance 
general public’s oversight of monetary decisions.9  
It has not come to my notice a study focused specifically on the 
relationship between the European Ombudsman and the ECB. 
Magnette (2003) and Cadeddu (2004) analyzed the political role and 
the institutional functions of the European Ombudsman. At some 
point, they both mentioned cases related to the ECB (Magnette, 
2003: 688-689; Cadeddu, 2004: 166, note 19). However, they did 
not focus on the effects produced by the Ombudsman’s decisions 
on the ECB framework.  
The European central bank was designed as a very independent 
institution. However, monetary decisions have wide social impacts. 
The ECB allocates resources among different social groups, i.e. 
creditors and debtors. Thus, despite the complexity of central bank 
decisions, “technical” issues on money are political in nature and 
define winners and losers in European society. Therefore, in 
democratic contexts, there is a demand for legal mechanisms that 
could maintain monetary power in check.  
If the legal structure for monetary policy is becoming more and 
more ex post in nature, as I suggested above, the Ombudsman is an 
important institution for this system. By means of an ex post control 
of governance procedures, the European Ombudsman can indirectly 
reach the content of monetary decisions by giving voice to 
stakeholders outside parliaments and markets.  
The key Ombudsman’s institutional attributes, which may impact 
the framework for monetary power’s oversight are: (i) its 
investigative power, (ii) its openness to complaints by any 
European citizens or residents without formalities, and (iii) its 
“contradictory” procedures, where complainant and 
administration dialogues and can reach an agreement. Its technical 
specialization on governance issues and good administrative 
practices reshapes citizen’s arguments and can put them in similar 
                                                
9 For a contribution related to the CJEU review of the European Council decisions, see 
Abazi and Hillebrandt (2015). 
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level of knowledge as European bureaucracies. In addition, it 
works through repressive measures that may generate effects on 
European institution’s reputation and prestige – a sort of sanction 
very feared by central banks.  
The Ombudsman has the potential to exercise political pressure on 
institutions in Europe, being a relevant “source of diffuse power” 
(Magnette, 2003: 682). It is a type of “soft justice”, which may suit 
the framework for the oversight of European monetary power. 
Therefore, it is a matter of empirical question: how and in which 
conditions the Ombudsman has been influencing the ECB 
transparency? 
§ 2 – GUARDING THE MONEY GUARDIAN: HOW THE EUROPEAN 
OMBUDSMAN’S DECISIONS ARE IMPROVING ECB ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND TRANSPARENCY  
The ECB has the confidentiality of its monetary deliberations 
guaranteed by treaty. Article 132(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU) delegates the disclosure of 
decisions up to the ECB itself. Protocol 4 of the TFEU states that 
the Governing Council’s regular meetings are confidential and only 
the central bank decides to announce them. Politically, “the power 
to decide the degree of transparency and the level of social 
accountability concerning monetary decisions is granted to the 
ECB” (Duran, 2015: 114-115).  
Therefore, the European Ombudsman can particularly contribute 
to broadening the oversight scope of the ECB. Up to present, it 
decided 9 (nine) cases concerning the central bank, which involved 
complaints related to the management of monetary policy as well 
as other institutional matters.10 The majority of the cases (6/9) were 
initiated by European citizens or residents, which reveals a high 
degree of Ombudsman’s openness and facilitated access (Table 1, 
below). Other cases comprised complaints by a member of the 
Parliament (1) and a non-governmental organization (1), as well as 
a procedure initiated by the Ombudsman’s own initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 I am not including in my empirical research cases related to the ECB’s legal regime for 
employees and other service contracts. These rules are not aimed at the general public 
concerns on the management of money, the focus of this paper.  
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Table 1. European Ombudsman’s cases concerning the 
ECB and the institutional design of monetary regulation 
 
C
ase 
denom
ination 
and official 
num
ber 
O
pened on 
 
O
m
budsm
an 
 
C
om
plainant 
 
Any 
im
provem
ent 
on the E
C
B
 
transparency? 
 
1. AnaCredit  
 
1993 2015 Emily O’Reilly Member of 
the 
European 
Parliament11 
Yes [most 
relevant] 
2. Eurozone 
convergence 
criteria  
 
356 2014 Emily O’Reilly European 
citizen or 
resident 
(German 
citizen) 
No. It was a 
missed 
opportunity 
3. Group of 
Thirty  
 
1339 2012 P. Nikiforos 
Diamendouros 
NGO12 Yes 
4. ECB 
communication 
with Spanish 
authorities  
 
2016 2011 P. Nikiforos 
Diamendouros 
European 
citizen or 
resident 
(Spanish 
lawyer) 
Yes 
5. Language for 
ECB 
communication 
– case II   
 
1008 2006 P. Nikiforos 
Diamendouros 
European 
citizen or 
resident 
(French) 
No. 
Actually, it 
had a 
negative 
impact. 
6. Exchange 
rate policy   
 
3054 2004 P. Nikiforos 
Diamendouros 
European 
citizen or 
resident 
Yes 
7. Euro 
banknotes   
 
1939 2002 P. Nikiforos 
Diamendouros 
European 
citizen or 
resident 
Yes 
8. Language for 
ECB 
communication 
– case I   
 
281 1999 Jacob 
Söderman 
European 
citizen or 
resident 
No. 
Actually, it 
had a 
negative 
impact 
9. Rules 
governing 
public access 
to documents  
 
0I/1 1999 Jacob 
Söderman 
Ombudsman 
(own 
initiative) 
Yes 
 
Among all these cases, two thirds (6/9) had a clear and identifiable 
contribution to ECB transparency and accountability (Table 1, 
above). In my qualitative analysis, I am not concerned with the 
case’s result, i.e. if the Ombudsman found any maladministration 
in relation to the complainant’s allegations. Anyway, in all of these 
cases, the Ombudsman declared there was no maladministration on 
the part of the ECB.  
                                                
11 The MEP is Sven Giegold, a German politician (Group of the Greens/European Free 
Alliance).  
12 This organization is the Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a NGO based in 
Brussels which works on exposing the power of lobby groups in Europe. 
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However, the Ombudsman’s particular contribution was 
elsewhere: by manipulating its (independent and soft) powers and 
establishing an institutional channel between the complainant and 
the ECB on transparency matters. Also, the Ombudsman vocalized 
issues related to governance transparency.  
In cases 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 (Table 1, above), the ECB seems to 
change its behavior to respond to the Ombudsman’s demands on 
transparency, or the Ombudsman used the procedures to vocalize 
significant arguments on central bank transparency. All 
Ombudsmen contributed to this movement (Emily O’Reilly, P. 
Nikiforos Diamandouros and Jacob Söderman). In case 2, no 
relevant impact on ECB transparency policy was identifiable, but 
in cases 5 and 8 there was, in fact, a negative impact, as I will explain 
below. 
 Case with relevant impact on ECB transparency 
The AnaCredit case (Case 1, Table 1, above) was the most 
remarkable one. By means of a complaint, a member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) manifested his concerns on the 
AnaCredit regulation to be issued by the ECB. The AnaCredit is “a 
project to set up a dataset containing detailed information on 
individual bank loans in the euro area, harmonized across all 
member states”.13 The central bank intention is to create a 
European analytical credit datasets. The MEP was concerned that 
this regulation may be a breach of higher-ranking EU law, 
particularly rules and principles concerning data protection. 
Furthermore, according to him, the ECB should carry out a public 
consultation before issuing this type of regulation, since it concerns 
millions of people in Europe.  
In her decision, the Ombudsman O’Reilley noted that the ECB 
was (currently) examining the MEP substantive concerns and has 
consulted the Data Protection Supervisor in Europe. Her first 
assessment was that, as prima facie, the legal basis for the AnaCredit 
did not seem to be wrong. However, in relation to the public 
consultation, she provoked the ECB to take action. In her words,  
“I note from material published by the ECB on 11 
November 2015 that the Bank ran a 'merits and costs' 
procedure, in which 'representatives of the banking 
industry were directly involved', mainly via the respective 
NCBs [national central banks]. It is further stated that the 
industry was informed on many occasions and extensively 
in writing. There is also mention of a possible public 
consultation should the ECB Governing Council consider 
an extension of the scope of the AnaCredit dataset in the 
future. Given that it has not been possible for my services 
to find a published report on the 'merits and costs' 
procedure, it is difficult to gauge to what extent 
stakeholders and the wider public have been given an 
                                                
13 ECB website. 
Soft-Law Mechanisms, Hard Institutional Impacts: How the European Ombudsman is Enhancing 
the European Central Bank’s Transparency Framework – Camila Villard Duran 
– 216 – 
International Journal of Open Governments 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
opportunity to provide structured input on this important 
initiative. The regulation to be adopted will affect millions 
of individuals; adopting it without ensuring the most 
appropriate consultation of stakeholders and the wider 
public may undermine the public trust of AnaCredit, 
irrespective of its merits. I understand there is no legal 
impediment to the ECB giving all stakeholders including 
the wider public an opportunity to voice their views.” 
(European Ombudsman, my emphasis, Fragments of the 
Ombudsman’s decision on the Case AnaCredit, 1693/2015/PD). 
The Ombudsman’s decision was issued on 20 November 2015. On 
4 December, the ECB published a draft regulation for the 
AnaCredit project and opened a period of more than 50 days for 
public consultation. The ECB also clarified that it would “provide 
feedback on how the observations received were assessed and 
taken into account in the Regulation”.14 The central bank also 
explained the confidential rules of the project: “[d]ata will be 
treated according to strict confidentiality rules as set out under 
existing European law, and will only be accessible to the 
[aforementioned] users and for the foreseen uses.”15  
Therefore, the ECB reacted positively to the Ombudsman’s 
decision promoting, almost immediately, a public consultation for 
the AnaCredit regulation (instead of considering only a “possible 
future consultation”) and, by its website, tried to address the initial 
concerns on data protection. Also, it is important to remark the 
Ombudsman’s sentences: she clearly vocalized the interests of 
other stakeholders, besides industry and national central banks.  
Possibly, this case had another effect related to the announcement 
of a research fellowship on ECB transparency in 9 December 2016. 
The second edition of the “ECB Legal Research Programme” 
called for papers on a “comprehensive analysis of the principle of 
transparency, including in view of the case law of the relevant courts and the 
practice of nonGjudicial subjects (e.g. the European Ombudsman) [which] 
would be relevant to determine whether transparency demands prevail over other 
competing requirements (related to central bank activities), favoring a more 
limited scrutiny.”16 It shows that the ECB is carefully considering the 
arguments presented by the Ombudsman and the MEP.  
The second case, which had a relative impact on the ECB, was the 
contestation made by a NGO on the central bank president’s 
membership of the Group of Thirty (Case 3, Table 1, above). The 
NGO stressed that this membership could jeopardize ECB 
independence, since private market agents were also members of 
this Group. In fact, this Group was considered, by the 
complainant, as a “lobbying vehicle”. In 2013, in his final decision, 
the Ombudsman P. Nikiforos Diamandouros analyzed in detail the 
                                                
14 See the ECB announcement at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/aggregates/anacredit/html/index.en.html 
15 See the ECB announcement at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/aggregates/anacredit/html/index.en.html  
16 See the announcement at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/conferences/html/20151209_lrp.en.html 
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Group of Thirty’s membership and financial support. It found a 
great variety of interests inside the institution and did not 
characterize it as a private market’s lobby group. In fact, he 
understood that this Group is a very diverse forum, in which ideas 
on monetary regulation could be exchanged in an open dialogue. 
He emphasizes that the ECB should dialogue in other forums as 
well, not only the Group of Thirty.17  
Another particular contribution of this case was in the 
Ombudsman’s “further remarks”. Diamandouros stressed that the 
European economic crisis increased the public visibility and 
expectations in relation to the ECB and its role. He noted “further 
responsibilities are likely to be entrusted to the ECB in the future, 
in particular as regards the supervision of banks. These 
developments mean that not only the ECB, but the EU as whole, 
has a vital interest in ensuring hat the ECB further raises the quality 
of its communication with the public”.18 He invited the ECB to 
include the information on the President’s Group of Thirty 
membership in his CV at the central bank website and encouraged 
the bank “to take steps to further raise the quality of its 
communication with the public”.19 The ECB responded to the 
Ombudsman demand and included this information on its 
President’s CV.  
Three cases with significant impacts (Case 4, 6 and 7, Table 1, 
above) concerned European citizens’ demands to access ECB 
documents or information. The most valuable one, in terms of the 
qualitative content of arguments brought forth by the 
Ombudsman, was the Case 4 (“ECB communication with Spanish 
authorities”). In this case, a Spanish lawyer asked for access to a 
document sent by the ECB to political authorities in Spain. The 
central bank refused the demand based on the exception 
concerning protection of economic and monetary policy interests 
(Article 4(1) (a), second indent of Decision ECB/2004/3). 
However, in the European citizen’s view, the ECB decision was 
not issued with appropriate statement of reasons.  
In this case, the Ombudsman mentioned cases-law at the CJEU to 
identify the European legal regime on the “statement of reasons”. 
In his words,  
                                                
17 In his words,  
“[...] the obligation to maintain an "open" dialogue with civil society also 
implies that the dialogue should be balanced, affording diverse interlocutors an 
appropriate opportunity to debate issues of relevance to the work of the ECB. 
This observation does not imply that members of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB should seek only to engage with those civil society groups that 
encompass, internally, the entire diversity of views on issues of relevance to the 
work of the ECB. Indeed, it is unlikely that such all-encompassing groups exist. 
Rather, it means that efforts should be made to discuss the work of the ECB 
in diverse fora, in addition to discussing the work of the ECB in the context of 
entities such as the Group of Thirty.”  
(European Ombudsman, Fragments of the Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 
1339/2012/FOR, my emphasis). 
18 Fragments of the Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 1339/2012/FOR, European 
Ombudsman, my emphasis. 
19 Fragments of the Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 1339/2012/FOR, European 
Ombudsman, my emphasis. 
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the Court of Justice “has clearly held that, when processing 
an application for access to documents, the institutions 
must carry out a specific examination of each document 
concerned. The mere fact that a document concerns an 
interest protected by an exception is not, in itself, sufficient 
to justify the application of that exception. On the contrary, 
the institution in question must, in principle, explain how 
disclosure of the document could specifically and 
effectively undermine the interest protected by the 
exception invoked. In addition to that, the risk of protected 
interests being undermined must be reasonably foreseeable 
and not purely hypothetical.”20  
(European Ombudsman, Fragments of Fragments of the 
Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 2016/2011/ER, my 
emphasis). 
During this inquiry, the ECB reviewed its position and send to the 
complainant a more appropriate statement of reasons, describing 
the content of the letter and explaining the sensitivity of the issue, 
as well as the central bank’s reasons and intentions underlying the 
letter’s issuance. In his further remarks, the Ombudsman asked for 
more transparency and more concern on the part of the ECB. In 
his words,  
“the European Central Bank [should] continue to regard 
the disclosure of documents to the public, and the 
reasoning of decisions refusing disclosure, not only as legal 
obligations, but also as an opportunity to demonstrate its 
commitment to the principle of transparency and thereby 
to enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.”21  
The Cases 6 and 7 (“Exchange rate policy” and “Euro banknotes”) 
concerned the same matter: the ECB did not explain sufficiently its 
reasons for not providing information related to, respectively, its 
exchange rate policy and statistics on stock and flows of euro 
banknotes. In the latter case, Diamandouros warned the ECB he 
could not accept that the central bank “is entitled” to rely on an 
intellectual argument related to “irrational behavior” from public 
(such as the idea of run on banknotes in countries where there are 
less stock). The ECB did not offer “evidence to substantiate this 
argument which, moreover, does not appear to relate to any of the 
exceptions” contained in the central bank regulation (Article 4, 
Decision ECB/2004/3).22 Therefore, the Ombudsman stressed 
                                                
20 The cases-law were: Case C-506/08 P Sweden v MyTravel and Commission, judgment of 21 
July 2011, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 76; Case T-250/08 Bachelor v 
Commission, judgment of 24 May 2011, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 78; Case 
T-166/05 Borax Europe v Commission, judgment of 11 March 2009, not yet published in 
the ECR, paragraph 88; Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and CG532/07 P Sweden 
and Others v API and Commission, judgment of 21 September 2010, not yet published in the 
ECR, paragraph 72; Joined Cases C- 39/05 P and C- 52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council 
[2008] ECR I-1429, paragraph 43; Case T- 2/03 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v 
Commission [2005] ECR II-1121, paragraph 69; Sison v Council, cited in footnote 5, 
paragraph 75.” 
21 European Ombudsman, Fragments of the Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 2016/2011/ER. 
22 European Ombudsman, Fragments of Fragments of the Ombudsman’s decision on the Case 
1939/2002/IJH. 
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that economic ideas are not accepted as reasons for reducing 
central bank transparency.  
Case 9 (“Rules governing public access of documents”) also 
produced a relevant impact and it was the first one involving the 
ECB. It was an inquiry on the Jacob Söderman’s initiative 
concerning different European institutions and the issuance of 
their rules governing public access to documents. The first ECB 
regulation regarding this issue was the Decision 1998/12 and the 
Ombudsman identified some problems in it. The most relevant 
problem identified was: the ECB only regulated the access of so-
called “administrative documents” and did not mention the 
procedures to have access to the Governing Council decisions on 
monetary policy, such as the meetings’ minutes. The dialogue with 
the ECB, during the inquiry, seemed to be tension. The ECB 
remembered the Ombudsman that, according to the TFEU, it was 
not obliged to disclosure its decisions. The Ombudsman replied 
saying that the central bank can disclosure if it decides to, and the 
regulation should govern this procedure. He referred to different 
cases-law at the CJEU.  
It is difficult to identify a casual relationship between this 
Ombudsman’s decision, issued on 24 September 1999, and the 
developments on the ECB transparency policy during the 2000s. 
However, it is important to note that this inquiry was the first to 
establish an institutional dialogue between these two European 
institutions and, after this first one, the ECB seems to be more 
cordial and attentive to the Ombudsman’s demands and remarks. 
Also, the Ombudsman clearly vocalized a particular concern with 
the Governing Council’s minutes, which contain the most relevant 
decisions for the European monetary policy.  
The ECB decided to regularly publish minutes only in 2015,23 but 
it issued a better regulation concerning access to documents in 
2004 (ECB Decision 2004/3), in which there are no more 
distinctions between “administrative documents” and other 
decisional papers. The regulation applies for any document 
formalized by the ECB, which could have as a source the 
Ombudsman’s concern.24  
 Cases without contribution, or with negative 
impact on ECB transparency  
One case had no particular impact on ECB transparency (Case 2, 
“Eurozone convergence criteria”, Table 1, above). It was a missed 
opportunity for the Ombudsman to contribute to the central bank 
governance. However, in cases 5 and 8, concerning a common 
issue (i.e. the “language of ECB communication”), it seems that the 
Ombudsman contributed negatively with the transparency of 
European monetary decisions. 
                                                
23 However, since its creation, the ECB established an institutional practice of organizing 
press conferences after the Governing Council’s meetings. 
24 However, only interviews can confirm this hypothesis. 
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In case 2 (“Eurozone convergence criteria”), Ombudsman 
O’Reilley received a complaint by a European citizen, in which that 
he/she argues the ECB was not publishing statistics on 
convergence criteria in “user-friendly” form, like a check box. The 
ECB replied that it publishes the relevant data on annual reports 
and by other means. Moreover, it stressed that member states are 
called upon to steer their fiscal and other policies in compliance 
with other criteria in addition to the convergence one.  
The Ombudsman did not identify a duty on the part of the ECB 
to publish the information in the way the complainant asked for 
and did not develop further remarks. However, in this case, I 
believe the Ombudsman could contribute more to ECB 
transparency encouraging the central bank to invest in a less 
complicated form to communicate with European community. 
The US Fed, for instance, has been investing in a website for 
financial education and it contains clear explanations about the 
Federal Reserve system and its functioning.25 The Ombudsman 
could have used this kind of complaint to remember the ECB that 
there is more alternatives to create a friendly environment for the 
understanding of complex matters in European monetary and 
economic policy.  
In cases 5 and 8, I believe the main negative contribution was the 
acceptance by the Ombudsman (Diamandouros and Söderman, 
respectively) of a precise ECB argument, i.e. that there are two 
different documents about monetary decisions: one to be 
addressed to experts and financial markets, concerning “technical 
issues” in monetary policy and published in English; others to be 
shared with the European community and written in all languages.  
This “differentiated language regime” drew a line between monetary 
decisions (technical issues) and “general information”. 
Nevertheless, the so-called “technical” decisions have allocational 
effects on social groups. In both cases, the Ombudsman did not 
explore the monetary argument and allowed the ECB to be less 
transparent for the general public. Of course, there is a concern on 
cost-efficiency to publish ECB documents in all community 
languages, however an intermediate approach should have been 
explored by the central bank to assure its legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an ongoing research and an initial exam of the 
European Ombudsman’s decisions involving the ECB. I believe 
that this institution has been contributing to expand the 
transparency in monetary policy. Despite its soft-law powers, the 
Ombudsman is promoting hard effects on the ECB accountability. 
However, there is more room to improve it. At least in three cases 
(3/9), the Ombudsman did not contribute or impacted negatively 
in central bank governance. 
  
                                                
25 The website is: https://www.federalreserveeducation.org. 
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